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Using micro data on judicial proceedings in Uruguay, this paper presents evidence 
that female defendants receive more favorable treatment in courts than male 
defendants. This is due to longer foreclosure proceedings and higher probabilities 
of being granted extensions in evictions and dispossessions for female defendants.  
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1. Introduction  
 
It is widely accepted that the development of the housing market is related to the efficiency of 
the available legal remedies (the easier to have a person evicted or a mortgaged property 
executed, the lower probabilities of facing a breach by a debtor). Therefore, if it is more costly 
and difficult to take over the collateral of women debtors, the market might be less willing to 
provide them with the required long-term financing to acquire a house.  
In this paper we present evidence that the presence of a woman grants the defendant party 
judicial benefits that translate into extensions and longer proceedings, and we do so by using 
micro data to test whether courts are indeed more lenient with women than with men. Therefore, 
this paper reports evidence of favorable treatment of women in the judiciary system.  
Gender differences in court outcomes have been explained among others by paternalism, 
court chivalry, differences in male and female criminality and the practical problems of jailing 
women with children. Remaining agnostic about the true cause of gender disparities does not 
prevent us from concluding that the existence of legal or judicial differentiation in favor of 
women may induce creditors to offer them worse financing conditions since transactions with 
them could involve higher costs in case of a breach of the obligations assumed. That may induce 
worse housing outcomes for females and female-headed families. Thus, in addition to providing 
insights into the efficiency of the judicial system, this paper is relevant for housing and poverty 
alleviation policies.  
There is a sizable literature on disparities in judicial decision-making, but most of it has 
focused on the socioeconomic characteristics of the judges or on the gender and ethnic origin of 
defendants. Peresie (2005) finds that the gender composition of the bench affected federal 
appellate court outcomes in sexual harassment and sex discrimination cases. In contrast, 
Schanzenbach (2005) concludes that judges’ race and sex have little influence on prison 
sentences in general but affect racial and sex disparities. Manning, Carroll and Carp (2004) 
report that younger judges were less inclined to accept allegations of age discrimination. Mustard 
(2001) finds that Blacks, males and offenders with low education and income levels receive 
longer sentences in federal courts. Kleck (1981) summarizes the literature on sentencing 
differences in rape and murder death sentences.  
Our paper is no doubt part of this tradition but departs from it in at least three dimensions. 
First, most of the research conducted so far reflects the situation in developed countries,   5
especially the United States. The efficiency of institutions in general and legal institutions in 
particular, however, is generally considered to be much worse in less developed countries, which 
makes Uruguay an interesting country case. Second, our paper focuses on housing market-related 
cases, an area that has been neglected both by this judicial disparities literature and also by the 
housing discrimination literature, which has focused on access to mortgage credit.
1 Finally, our 
paper focuses on disparities produced by the gender of the defendant in proceedings that are not 
related to sex issues (e.g., sexual harassment).  
We found that, all else equal, the presence of women is associated with foreclosure 
proceedings that take between two to three months more than cases against male defendants. 
This represents a delay of more than 10 percent of the time taken by the average case. Also, in 
comparison with all-male defendants, the presence of women in the defendant party increases by 
25 percent the probability of being granted an extension in evictions cases.  
Gandelman (2006) presents evidence of lower probabilities of homeownership for female 
headed households in Latin American Countries. Although not specifically tested, the evidence 
presented in this paper may explain that result. Favorable legal treatment of women is a partial 
equilibrium result that may seem “positive” for women. This favorable treatment is likely to be 
transparent for all actors in the market, and therefore one could expect a general equilibrium 
result in which the market internalizes the favorable court’s treatment in the form of harsher 
conditions in the housing market.  
 
2. Methodology and Legal Background 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Before 2002, there were no laws in Uruguay intended to address explicitly the situation of 
women in housing market-related issues. With the passing of Law 17.495 in the year 2002 the 
state of affairs changed. The law now addresses one specific situation: women who are pregnant 
during the wintertime. 
This law complements an older one (Law 13.405) authorizing judges to extend the time 
for eviction up to 120 days in cases of force majeure. Interestingly, this new law requires judges 
to take into account if a pregnant woman, a child under 14 years old or a person above 70 years 
old lives in the house when granting extensions of terms during the winter time. The law 
establishes that the presence of a pregnant woman in the house has to be considered as a case of 
                                                           
1 See, for instance, Ladd (1998).   6
force majeure. Commenting on this law, parliamentarians have stated that all these are cases of 
especially vulnerable people. 
Even before the law was passed, however, courts did take these facts into consideration. 
This case represents an instance when the law does not anticipate solutions in order to avoid 
problems but reproduces what has already been occurring in practice to ensure that every person 
in that situation will have the same treatment.  
Despite the fact that there are no other laws that explicitly protect women, it is widely 
accepted that women are treated more favorably than men in housing market-related cases. It is 
more a matter of judicial practice than a matter of law: judges seem to take gender differentials 
into consideration, for example, when granting extensions of terms to evict or dispossess.  
In that sense, establishing the specific determinants of a differential treatment in the 
judicial practice seems to be a necessary starting point. In other words, we need to start by 
determining what favorable treatment of women means in terms of judicial practice. 
One possible approach would be to search for gender patterns in judges’ final decisions, 
as in the literature cited in the previous section. However, this approach is not applicable to the 
cases studied in this paper because of the type of proceedings considered. The cited literature 
studies criminal cases where the content of the final decision can vary depending on the 
circumstances (the judge can either find the defendant innocent or guilty). In contrast, the content 
of the final decision in the cases studied for this paper (taking for final decision, the one that 
orders dispossession, eviction or the auction sale of the mortgage property) is always the same 
one. The relevant variable is the time (forgone income) that it takes for the claimant to achieve 
that decision. Therefore, instead of a consequentialist approach we will take a procedural 
approach to determine the differential treatment in the judicial practice.  
One of the most important determinants is the duration of the proceedings, that is, the 
time that elapses from the moment a case is submitted to the Court to the end of the proceedings. 
For this reason we have analyzed, case by case, the duration of the proceedings and 
differentiated between those with female defendants and those with male defendants. 
Five types of judicial proceedings are related to the housing market and are therefore part 
of this investigation: 
•  The  mortgage foreclosure process is the legal action to force the sale of 
mortgaged property in order to obtain payment for the outstanding balance of   7
a loan, a debt generated upon the purchase of the said property, or a debt 
generated by condominium expenses. This action ends with the auction sale of 
the mortgaged property to a new landowner.  
•  The  annulment of promissory purchase agreement and the annulment of 
purchase agreement are the proceedings initiated upon the breach of the 
obligation to pay the installments of a purchase or promissory purchase 
agreement. These proceedings seek to have the agreement annulled and the 
property restituted. The action is concluded when the Court orders the 
annulment of the agreement. 
•  Eviction is a legal proceeding that the owner has to initiate for the 
dispossession of the property in case it is occupied. For instance, when a 
person simply enters into a house without the owner’s permission and there is 
no rental agreement, either verbal or written, an eviction process has to be 
initiated. This is concluded only when a Court orders the occupiers to evict.  
•  Should the former debtor occupy a property that has been auctioned, an action 
in rem is the legal proceeding that needs to be initiated for the dispossession 
of the property. In that case, the new landowner has to initiate this new legal 
proceeding in order to have access to his new property. The same happens in 
the case where the debtor of a purchase agreement that has already been 
annulled occupies the property. To obtain the dispossession of the property, 
the owner, after concluding the legal action to annul the purchase or 
promissory purchase agreement and recover the property, needs to initiate an 
action in rem in case the property is occupied. This action is concluded when 
the Court orders the dispossession of the property. 
 
Before filing any of these claims plaintiffs are required to submit certain basic 
information before the Caseflow Coordination Office (“Oficina Distribuidora de Turnos”). This 
is the office that assigns the court and term that will be in charge of the case and provides a case 
number that will accompany the file through the process. Once the information is submitted there 
is no chance to change the court that was assigned, not even by resubmitting information, since 
this case will always appear as a “precedent” and all related cases will therefore be sent to the 
same court.    8
3. Data 
 
With the support of the Supreme Court of Justice of Uruguay, we had access to the database of 
the Caseflow Coordination Office. The universe of cases for this investigation was defined upon 
our review of the following database: 1,337 foreclosure proceedings, 66 annulments of purchase 
agreements, 388 actions in rem, 56 annulments of promissory purchase agreements and 590 
evictions were submitted to the Caseflow Coordination Office during the year 2002. Therefore, 
there is a potential set of 2,437 judicial proceedings.
2  
Once we identified all the case numbers, we went to the court offices involved to 
investigate the files, the Supreme Court of Justice having sent letters to each one of the offices to 
make the files available for our review.  While reviewing the files we found out that 154 actions 
were not related to real estate but to other issues such as vehicles. Other files were not available 
for our review. Reasons for this included files’ being at a judge’s desk (ongoing cases) or being 
“lost” at the office (most of those were not ongoing cases); 215 files were unavailable. We also 
realized that, even though some cases appeared in the Case Flow Office’s database, they were 
never submitted to the court. A possible explanation is that agreements were achieved in the time 
that elapsed between the submission to the Case Flow Office and the filing of the claims; there 
are 56 cases in that situation.  Our suspicion is also based on the fact that many private 
transactions occur when legal proceedings have already begun. In fact, 19.5 percent of the 
investigated cases were closed because the parties entered into private transactions. For all these 
reasons, the total amount of cases that could be included in our database is 2,012. Finally, due to 
consistency problems in the judicial files we ended up with a database of 1,973 cases.
3 
The creation of the database with all the relevant information for this investigation was 
probably the most time-consuming stage of the research, since courts in Uruguay do not keep 
electronic but hard copies of the files. Each file has many pages with copious handwritten notes, 
which make it more difficult to process.  
                                                           
2 The most common eviction proceeding is when a former tenant stops paying his due rent and the landlord initiates 
the eviction process. In 2002, there were about 3,000 such cases. Although we acknowledge it would have been 
interesting to have them in our database, they were not included for two reasons: i) we were unable to collect a 
database of more than 5,000 cases and ii)  we preferred to focus on the other types of proceedings that are more 
directly related to homeownership.  
3 For instance, although the universe was defined with the cases that were initiated in 2002, we found files 
corresponding to cases that started before that date. These cases were dropped from the final database. We also 
found cases that started after 2002. These cases were included in the database since they were the continuation of 
judicial cases initiated in 2002; examples of such cases include actions in rem after a foreclosure mortgage.   9
Two different types of courts were involved in our investigation: The “Juzgados de Paz 
Departamentales de la Capital” and the “Juzgados Letrados de 1ª Instancia en lo Civil.” The 
former are in charge of the eviction processes and other types of legal actions involving small 
amounts of money. Cases involving larger amounts are assigned to the latter courts, which are 
specialized by subject and where judges have more experience because they are more advanced 
in their careers. Since there is one office per term, we had to review files in 38 different offices 
of the Juzgados de Paz and 20 Juzgados Letrados Civiles:  
 
•  829 of the cases investigated were submitted to the Juzgados de Paz. 
Interestingly, a female judge was in charge of about 90 percent of these cases.  
•  1,144 cases were submitted to the Juzgados Letrados. Since the number of 
male judges in the Juzgados Letrados is greater than in the Juzgados de Paz, 
so is the number of cases investigated where a male judge is in charge (30 
percent).  
 
With respect to the presence of women defendants, in 24 percent (450 cases) of the cases 
investigated (450 cases) the defendant party consisted only of men, while in 30 percent of the 
proceedings (562 cases) all the defendants were women. In the rest of the cases, the defendant 
party included both men and women.  
Although the cases investigated were submitted to the Court during the year 2002, not all 
of them are closed. In fact, 18.8 percent of total cases are still ongoing: three evictions, 14 
actions in rem, 347 foreclosures (246 ongoing and 101 cases in which the property has already 
been auctioned but the title deed is still pending) and seven annulments are in that situation. Only 
26 percent of cases have completed all the legal stages of the judicial proceeding. 
The following chart determines the amount of ongoing and closed cases and the reason 
for the closure. While some plaintiffs obtained the desired result by completing all the legal steps 
required, others entered into private transaction with the defendant party. The table shows that 
private transactions are more common in the foreclosure process than in other proceedings, 
representing 27 percent of foreclosure cases. Only 11 percent of the foreclosure proceedings 
have completed all the legal stages until the transfer of title deeds, but 9 percent of cases reached 
the auction stage.    10
In some cases, the plaintiff simply decides not to continue with the proceeding and gives 
notice of that decision to the Court (2 percent of cases). In other instances the plaintiff does not 
communicate with the Court but fails to continue with the proceeding (for example, by not  
submitting the required briefs). Files found to be inactive for a long time are sent to the Court’s 
archives, and such cases are considered closed unless the plaintiff files a brief requesting that the 
case be continued; 18 percent of the cases investigated are in that situation.  
 
 





























































































Ongoing cases  3 14  246  1  6  270 
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title deeds  - - 101  -  -  101 
Cases closed  
(completed all stages)  224 144  123  6  23  520 
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Total 544  263  1,101  16  48  1,972 
 





4.1 Basic statistics 
 
As noted before, one of the most important determinants of differential treatment in the judicial 
practice is the duration of proceedings. Table 2 corroborates that the duration of the proceedings 
varies in some cases when women are defendants. From the beginning of the foreclosure 
proceedings until the auction sale of the properties, when there is a female in the defendant party 
proceedings last from 50 to 70 more days than in cases against all male defendants (the variation   11
depends on whether the comparison is made with mixed male and female or only female cases). 
With respect to evictions and actions in rem, we respectively considered the time that elapses 
from the beginning of the litigation until the case comes to an end with the court’s order to evict 
or dispossess the property. Again looking at the means there seems to be a positive correlation 
between the duration of eviction cases and the presence of female defendants. Cases against all 
female defendants take longer than cases with both male and female defendants that, in turn, take 
longer than cases against only male defendants. In any case, the average differences reported are 
small and a t-test of mean difference cannot reject the null hypothesis of equal means.  
 
 
Table 2. Basic Statistics by Presence of Women 
      Foreclosures  Evictions  Actions in rem 
      Time from beginning of case until: 
      Auction Eviction  Dispossession 
Only men   Mean 571  299  346 
                   St. Dev.  335  205  281 
                   Cases 62  99  25 
Men and women   Mean 642  306  372 
                   St. Dev.  321  218  260 
                   Cases 205  43  80 
Only women   Mean 618  309  381 
                   St. Dev.  332  226  335 
                   Cases 85  76  39 
Total   Mean 624  304  370 
                   St. Dev.  326  214  284 
                   Cases  352  218  144 
             Source: Authors’ compilation.  
 
Another important determinant is the extensions of deadlines for eviction or 
dispossession.  In cases of both evictions and actions in rem, defendants are allowed to request 
more than one extension of the deadline for being evicted or dispossessed, and the judge decides 
whether to grant such extensions and, if so, for how many days. (This is the typical case of the 
previously mentioned Law Nº 17,495). If judges take into consideration the presence of women, 
either when they make the decision to grant an extension or when they decide the length of the 
extension, then women are indeed treated more favorably than men and the proceedings where 
women are involved will probably last longer than the merits of the case would have predicted. 
Table 3 therefore reports that in evictions and actions in rem there were extensions of 
terms in 268 cases, and in 72 percent of those cases (194 cases) the defendant party included  a   12
woman (either by herself or with a man). In 37 percent of cases (97 cases) where an extension 
occurred, defendant parities were made up only of women, and in 28 percent of cases (74 cases) 
the defendant party was made up only of men. That is to say, of the 252 evictions and action in 
rem against only male defendants, the judge granted an extension in 74 cases (29 percent). In the 
265 cases involving only female defendants, the judge granted an extension in 97 instances (37 
percent). 
 
Table 3. Extensions of terms by presence of women 
  NO  YES       Total
Only men  178 74    252 
     
Men and women  162 97 259 
     
Only women  168 97    265 
     
Total 508  268  776 
  Source: Authors’ compilation.  
 
 
  When women are defendants the amount of days granted as an extension increases. Table 
4 shows that the average extension in cases where women are the only defendant is 15 days, 
which decreases on average by three days when men are the only defendants. It should be noted 
that these averages include many cases in which the extensions were not granted (either because 
the defendant never requested them or because the court denied them). Only considering those 
cases where extensions were granted, the average extension time is 50 days.  
 
Table 4. Amount of Days of Extension 
by Presence of Woman 
  Average         St. Dev      Cases 
Only men  12.3 27.9 252 
     
Men and women  13.9 28.9 257 
     
Only women  15.0 30.3 265 
     
Total 13.8  29.1  774 
     Source: Authors’ compilation.  
   13
4.2 Econometric Results  
 
The evidence presented so far is unable to control for joint interactions of relevant variables. In 
order to do so we ran several multivariate regressions, and in order to check the robustness of our 
results we consider three subsets of the sample. The results with respect to gender are 
summarized in Table 5. The first row refers to the whole database, in the second raw we restrict 
to cases located in Montevideo and in the third raw we consider only cases of all male or all 
female defendants (i.e. we drop the cases of both male and female defendants). Tables 5, 6 and 7 
of the Appendix present a more detailed report of the regressions.  
With respect to foreclosures, in column A we consider the time elapsed from the 
beginning of the case until the auction takes place. As for evictions and actions in rem, in 
columns B and C, respectively, we considered the total amount of time from the beginning of the 
litigation until the case comes to an end with a court’s order to evict or dispossess, respectively. 
In these two types of cases it is possible and relatively common to ask for one or more 
extensions. Therefore in column D, using a probit model, we estimate the probability of such an 
event. To estimate the determinants of the total extended time we need to consider that this 
variable is truncated at 0, and therefore we proceed estimating a Tobit model in column E. 
Finally, we consider all type of cases together. Column F reports the determinants of the total 
time elapsed from the beginning until the end of the case, and in column G we estimate the 
probability that the case is still ongoing (taking more than four years). 
The main interest of this paper is in gender-based differential treatment. As stated in the 
previous section, our perception is that the mere presence of female in the defendant party (either 
solely or together with male defendant, as opposed to proceedings against all male defendants) 
changes the duration of the proceedings. Therefore, we defined a dummy variable Women that 
takes a value of 1 if at least one of the defendants is female. Exploding the information available 
in our database, we defined several control variables. Woman Judge is a dummy variable taking 
the value 1 in the presence of a female judge and 0 if the judge in charge is male (79 percent of 
all cases are under a female judges). As noted above, the Juzgados Letrados deal with more 
complex cases than the Juzgados de Paz. We therefore define a dummy Type of court that takes a 
value of 1 for the Juzgados de Paz (42 percent of cases) to control for this complexity. The type 
of lawyer hired by the defendant may also affect the outcome. Private defense takes a value of 1 
when the defendant hires a private lawyer (18 percent of all cases).    14
Although we considered only cases in courts in the capital city, the property in question 
may not necessarily be located in Montevideo. For those cases in which the property is located in 
Montevideo, using the address of the house in dispute, we were able to locate the neighborhood. 
Using information from the Household Survey conducted by the National Institute of Statistics, 
we then divided the sample according to the implied socioeconomic level of the neighborhood in 
which the property was located: low, middle-low, middle-high and high (9 percent, 27 percent,  
41 percent, and 22 percent, respectively, of the 1,616 properties located in the capital city).  
Using this same strategy we could also infer average household income and average 
home value. Uruguay has a population of about 3.3 million people divided in approximately 
equal shares between Montevideo, the capital city and the rest of the country. The household 
survey divides Montevideo into 62 neighborhoods, and all other urban areas are divided into 37 
zones. In our database we have cases corresponding to 61 of Montevideo’s neighborhoods and 
30 zones for the rest of the country. Using this division we calculated the average household 
income, the average rent and a comfort index, taking values from 1 to 9 depending on the 
number of appliances available at the household, and merged them with our database. We found 
the three measures to be very highly correlated and therefore in our estimation we used only one 
(Household Income measured in US dollars) to avoid colinearity problems. 
In foreclosure proceedings we controlled for the size of the debt lead to the legal dispute; 
in foreclosure cases the value of the original mortgage is available as well. Even though it is 
probable that the credits related to the cases in our database were not intended for purchasing a 
house, creditors are nonetheless willing to lend more to individuals with larger collateral. 
Therefore, the original mortgage can be used as a proxy for the value of the house in the 
foreclosure regressions.  
For the other proceedings in which we do not have a proxy for the value of the house we 
use our data on foreclosures to estimate a proxy of it. Using the 1,101 foreclosure cases we 
calculated the average house value (mortgage) by neighborhoods in Montevideo and by zones in 
the rest of the country and imputed this average to annulments of promissory purchase 
agreements, annulments of purchase agreements, evictions and actions in rem.  
Finally, in order not to report spurious results the standard errors of all regressions were 
adjusted for the cluster structure of the income and house value variables. We found that, after 
controlling for other variables, the presence of women is associated with longer foreclosure   15
proceedings. In particular it takes between 70 to 95 extra days (Column A of Table 5) to the 
actual auction when women are present. Considering the average time to get to auctions, 
according to our estimates using the whole sample, this represents an 11 percent increase in time. 
When the sample is restricted to Montevideo, the duration of judicial proceedings increases by f 
13 percent. Finally, when restricting the comparison to cases with only male and only female 
defendants, cases against women take 16 percent longer than cases against man.  
Although the point estimates suggest that evicting female defendants or recovering a 
property from females through an action in rem takes about 20 extra days (column B of Table 5), 
these estimates are not statistically different from 0. But, when all eviction and action in rem 
cases are considered together, we find that the presence of women is associated with a greater 
probability of being granted an extension (column D). The unconditional probability of obtaining 
an extension is 33 percent, and the marginal effect of Woman is 9 percent according to the 
estimation using the whole sample or restricting it to Montevideo. The marginal effect when 
comparing only female and only male defendants is 7 percent. Thus, the average defendant party 
with a female presence has an approximately 25 percent greater likelihood of obtaining an 
extension than in the case of all-male defendants. According to column E, using the whole 
sample, female defendants are granted 16 extra days of extension with respect to male 
defendants. This result is robust in the database restricted to Montevideo but is only significant at 
the 15 percent level using only male and only female defendants.  
Finally, columns F and G use information of all cases. The result on the extension of the 
proceeding in the woman row of column F could be seen as a weighted average of columns A, B 
and C, whereby female presence translates into proceedings that take between 50 to 60 more 
days. Finally, column G reports that female presence is associated with a greater probability that 
the case is still not finished, but with differences between types of judicial proceedings. If these 
still ongoing cases were to finish today we would have to include in our estimation many 
proceedings that have been in court for four years. Therefore the estimations of column A, B, C 
and G should be taken as the minimum effect of female presence. 
The rest of the variables included in the regressions presented reasonable results (see the 
Appendix). The lower the income of the household and the lower the value of the house, the 
longer it takes to auction the property in foreclosure proceeding. In the same regard our results 
suggest that the lower the value of the house, the longer it take to evict someone from it. As for   16
dispossessions and extensions of time, we found no statistically significant evidence of an effect 
for household income or the value of the property. The result in foreclosure proceedings is in line 
with the perceptions of paternalistic judges benefiting women and lower income households.  
Likewise, the larger the debt, the longer the extension of the foreclosure proceedings. The 
dummies for debt quartiles suggest that the relation is non-linear. Although we found no 
statistically significant effect for the second and third debt quartiles, the proceedings 
corresponding to the largest debts (fourth quartile) last about 40 percent longer (from 260 to 300 
extra days).  
More complex cases in which the defendant hires a private lawyer to defend himself take 
longer for all types of proceedings and increase the probability of extensions being granted. In 
foreclosure proceedings the extension of time (valued at the mean duration) is on the order of 25 
percent, in evictions it is about 40 percent, and in dispossessions about 60 percent. 
 
Table 5. Summary Regression Results 
 Foreclosures Evictions  Actions  in 
rem 
Evictions and 
Actions in rem 
All Cases 




































































































































  A  B C D E F G 
Estimation method:  OLS  OLS  OLS  Probit  Tobit  OLS  Probit 
        (mg effect)      (mg effect) 
Complete Database          
Woman 69.3  23.8  27.1  8.9% 16.16 55.0 29.2% 
 (35.3)*  (34.9)  (38.6)  (0.03)***  (7.60)**  (25.3)**  (0.04)*** 
Only houses located in 
Montevideo 
        
Woman  81.2  19.8  26.1  8.6% 16.80 59.7 19.7% 
  (40.8)* (32.9) (45.6)  (0.03)***  (7.67)**  (26.7)**  (0.04)*** 
          
Only cases against all male and 
all females 
        
Woman  95.7 23.5 8.4 6.8%  12.69  49.8*  0.0% 
  (52.2)* (42.1) (54.9)  (0.03)*  (8.65)*  (30.9) (0.25) 
Cluster standard errors in parentheses. 
* significant at 15%; ** significant at 10%; *** significant at 5%   17
5. Conclusions 
 
Before 2002, there were no laws in Uruguay intended to address explicitly the situation of 
women in housing market-related issues. As of today, there is only one law that specifically 
takes the situation of women into consideration. This paper confirms the perception that even 
though there is no legal tradition of explicitly addressing the situation of women, in practice  
courts do treat woman more leniently. In that context, this paper presents field evidence from 
judicial proceedings that the gender of the defendant affects the duration of the case. All else 
equal, proceedings against female defendants take longer and women are more likely to be 
granted extensions than men. Given that there is evidence that female headed-households have a 
lower probability of attaining homeownership in Uruguay, our results are a possible explanation 
for the worse female outcomes in the housing market.  
The reported favorable treatment of women by the courts is a partial equilibrium result 
that may seem “positive” for women in the sense that, even when they do not have the right to 
stay there, they manage to remain in their current home longer than men.  
A necessary condition for the development of the housing market (e.g., mortgage 
financing) is the efficiency of the available legal remedies in case of facing a breach by a debtor. 
Therefore, if it is more difficult to take over the collateral of women debtors the market might be 
stricter in contract conditions with women.  
In this sense, it is possible to conjecture that the general equilibrium result of the 
favorable court’s treatment is more difficult access to long-term financing for acquiring a house 
and ultimately a lower probability of attaining homeownership. Similarly, if females and female- 
headed families are more likely granted extensions in eviction cases, landlords may reasonably 
request harsher guaranties in order to rent their properties to them.  
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Appendix 
 
Table 6. Regression analysis  
 Foreclosures  Evictions  Actions  in 
rem 
Evictions and 
Actions in rem 
All Cases 




































































































































  A  B C D E F G 
Estimation  method:  OLS  OLS  OLS Probit Tobit OLS Probit 
Woman  69.3 23.8  27.1  0.25  16.16  55.0  4.08 
 (35.3)*  (34.9)  (38.6)  (0.09)***  (7.60)**  (25.3)**  (0.37)*** 
        - 3 . 7 8   Woman*(Prom. Purch. 
Agreem.)          (0.52)*** 
        1.48  Woman*(Purchase 
Agreement)          (0.35)*** 
Woman*(Foreclosure)          - 4 . 0 4  
          (0.41)*** 
Woman*(Action in rem)          - 4 . 0 5  
          (0.26)*** 
Household Income  -0.2  -0.0  -0.0 -0.00  -0.00 -0.0 -0.00 
  (0.1)***  (0.1)  (0.2) (0.00)  (0.02) (0.0)  (0.00)*** 
House Value  -0.6 -0.5  0.9  0.00  0.01  -0.2  0.00 
  (0.2)*** (0.2)** (1.3)  (0.00) (0.14)  (0.2)  (0.00) 
Debt (2nd. quartile)  66.3       
  (44.8)        
Debt (3th. quartile)  7.0       
  (41.6)        
Debt (4th. quartile)  264.9        
  (46.8)***        
Woman Judge  -110.0  28.1 -15.2 0.12 5.71 -85.7 0.12 
  (40.2)*** (47.7) (39.6) (0.11)  (10.83)  (27.6)***  (0.08) 
Private defense  160.2  123.8  221.4 0.43 27.81  119.1 0.46 
  (51.1)*** (30.5)***  (60.8)***  (0.09)*** (7.60)*** (28.2)*** (0.11)*** 
Type of court (de Paz)  180.8 138.8  6.7 -0.20  11.22  -200.2  -0.76 
  (76.9)** (66.7)**  (63.4)  (0.13)  (8.36)  (25.2)***  (0.11)*** 
Control for Type of case          Included 
          
Constant  617.6 113.5  261.3  -0.67  -77.32  573.7  -5.67 
  (55.6)*** (89.8)  (104.7)**  (0.19)*** (16.08)*** (40.3)***  (0.27)*** 
Observations  364  222 146 789 787 731  1912 
R-squared  0.22 0.08  0.13    0.13  
Mean Dependent 
Variable 
621.9  305.2 364.2 0.336  13.5  474.9 0.188 
Cluster standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 15%; ** significant at 10%; *** significant at 5% 
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Table 7. Regression Analysis (Montevideo) 
 Foreclosures  Evictions  Actions  in 
rem 
Evictions and 
Actions in rem 
All Cases 




































































































































  A  B C D E F G 
Estimation  method:  OLS  OLS  OLS Probit Tobit OLS Probit 
       (coeff.)     (coeff.) 
Woman  81.2 19.8  26.1  0.24  16.80  59.7  4.00 
 (40.8)*  (32.9)  (45.6)  (0.09)***  (7.67)**  (26.7)**  (0.43)*** 
        - 3 . 3 1   Woman*(Prom. Purch. 
Agreem.)          (0.68)*** 
         Woman*(Purchase 
Agreement)          
Woman*(Foreclosure)          - 3 . 9 5  
          (0.49)*** 
Woman*(Action in rem)          - 4 . 1 3  
          (0.40)*** 
Household Income  -0.1 -0.0  -0.1  -0.00  -0.01  0.0  -0.00 
  (0.1)**  (0.1)  (0.2) (0.00)  (0.02) (0.1)  (0.00)*** 
House Value  -0.8 -0.4  1.8  0.00  0.02  -0.3  0.00 
  (0.3)*** (0.2)* (1.1) (0.00)  (0.14) (0.2) (0.00) 
Debt (2nd. quartile)  113.3        
  (50.6)**        
Debt (3th. quartile)  21.2       
  (49.2)        
Debt (4th. quartile)  301.5        
  (59.2)***        
Woman Judge  -142.8 22.3  -26.6  0.12  4.74  -103.1  0.05 
  (49.4)*** (46.7) (41.5) (0.12) (10.93)  (29.9)***  (0.11) 
Private defense  173.1  131.2  233.8 0.39 26.28  132.2 0.50 
  (54.4)*** (28.5)***  (65.4)***  (0.09)*** (7.63)*** (28.9)*** (0.14)*** 
Type of court (de Paz)  185.9 43.5  -0.5  -0.21  9.48  -176.8  -0.65 
  (84.1)** (24.2)*  (72.3) (0.13) (8.54)  (26.1)***  (0.11)*** 
Control for Type of case          Included 
          
Constant  589.7 203.9  285.8  -0.61  -72.43  527.2  -5.79 
  (54.6)*** (72.8)***  (112.5)**  (0.19)*** (16.22)*** (44.3)***  (0.31)*** 
Observations  256  218 137 764 762 610  1578 
R-squared  0.28 0.08  0.14    0.14  
Mean Dependent Variable  605.9  300.9 374.7 0.340  13.8  445.8 0.155 
Cluster standard errors in parentheses. 
* significant at 15%; ** significant at 10%; *** significant at 5% 
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Table 8. Regression Analysis (All Male vs. All Female) 
 
 Foreclosures  Evictions  Actions  in 
rem 
Evictions and 
Actions in rem 
All Cases 




































































































































  A  B C D E F G 
Estimation  method:  OLS  OLS  OLS Probit Tobit OLS Probit 
          
Woman  95.7 23.5 8.4 0.19  12.69  49.8*  0.00 
 (52.2)*  (42.1)  (54.9)  (0.10)*  (8.65)*  (30.9)  (0.25) 
        0.06  Woman*(Prom. Purch. 
Agreem.)          (0.82) 
         Woman*(Purchase 
Agreement)          
Woman*(Foreclosure)          0.01 
          (0.29) 
Woman*(Action in rem)          - 0 . 1 5  
          (0.00) 
Household Income  -0.0  -0.0  0.2 -0.00  -0.02 0.0 -0.00 
  (0.1)  (0.1)  (0.2) (0.00)  (0.02) (0.1)  (0.00)*** 
House Value  -0.6 -0.3  -0.6  0.00  -0.04  -0.4  0.00 
  (0.3)*  (0.3)  (2.2) (0.00)  (0.16) (0.2) (0.00) 
Debt (2nd. quartile)  121.0        
  (76.0)        
Debt (3th. quartile)  -24.7        
  (53.3)        
Debt (4th. quartile)  263.3        
  (66.5)***        
Woman Judge  -158.3 17.5 10.2 0.11 6.62 -72.9 0.10 
  (57.9)*** (51.3) (101.6) (0.17) (14.14)  (40.2)* (0.15) 
Private defense  264.0  111.5  240.2 0.26 22.34  112.6 0.39 
  (86.1)*** (38.3)*** (153.2)  (0.11)** (9.34)**  (37.3)***  (0.17)** 
Type of court (de Paz)  349.6 49.2  -55.9  -0.10  20.11  -177.4  -0.67 
  (92.9)*** (34.2)  (55.5)  (0.18) (12.57)  (33.5)***  (0.17)*** 
Control for Type of case          Included 
          
Constant  539.1 215.7  268.2  -0.50  -69.78  532.2  -5.76 
  (61.6)*** (101.2)** (163.1)  (0.23)** (19.89)*** (55.3)***  (0.00) 
Observations  136 172 59 503  503  366  945 
R-squared  0.30  0.06  0.12    0.13  
Mean Dependent Variable  595.1  305.7 377.5 0.332  13.9  425.3 0.134 
Cluster standard errors in parentheses. 
* significant at 15%; ** significant at 10%; *** significant at 5% 
 